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“Tax administration is tax policy.”
Casanegra de Jantscher
In the past two decades, a number of reforms have taken
place in the country's tax structure. However, despite these re-
forms, serious problems continue to prevail in the Philippines' tax
administration system as manifested in the continued high levels
of tax evasion, thereby suggesting that modifications in the tax
structure alone are not enough.
Given this, this Policy Notes examines new perspectives
espoused in recent theoretical literature on tax evasion which call
for a need to reassess existing tax administration practices that
have a bearing on economic incentives affecting the behavior of
two major actors in the tax compliance process: the taxpayer and
the tax collector.
Hopefully, the new theoretical views would help in com-
ing up with better and more comprehensive measures in improv-
ing tax administration.
Recent efforts in tax restructuring
The government undertook an extensive restructur-
ing of the tax system in 1986. While the previous efforts
to change tax policy were piecemeal in nature, the 1986
Tax Reform Package represented the first attempt at a
comprehensive reform of the country’s tax system. Rev-
enue generation was not the sole consideration in its
design as equity and efficiency objectives both received
considerable weight.
The major components of the 1986 Tax Reform Pack-
age were:
] shift from the schedular to a more global ap-
proach in taxing individual income from compensation,
business, trade and exercise of profession;1
] increase in personal and additional exemptions;
] separate treatment of income of spouses;
] increase in the final withholding tax rate on in-
terest income and royalties, from 17.5 percent and 15
percent, respectively, to a uniform rate of 20 percent;
] phase-out of the final withholding tax previously
levied on dividends;
__________
*The author is Senior Research Fellow at the Philippine Institute for
Development Studies.
1Passive income like interest income, royalties and capital gains,
however, continue to be subjected  to a final withholding tax.2
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] unification of the earlier dual tax rate (of 25
and 35 percent) levied on corporate income to 35 per-
cent;
] introduction of the value added tax (VAT) in place
of the sales/turnover tax and a host of other taxes;
] conversion of unit rates formerly used for ex-
cise taxes to ad valorem rates;
] abolition of export taxes; and
] further reduction in tariff rates.2
From 1987 onwards, the government had to intro-
duce more tax changes primarily to respond to the need
to raise more revenues within the context of a series of
fiscal adjustment programs. Not all, however, were con-
sistent with the spirit of the 1986 reform package. Some,
like the import levy imposed in 1991, were put in place
because they were administratively and politically conve-
nient. However, they were generally seen as highly
distortionary and having a perverse effect on long-term
growth.
What are some of these changes?
In 1992, the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme
(SNITS) was introduced. The SNITS increased personal
exemptions, restricted deductions that can be claimed
against gross income, reverted the individual income tax
system to the schedular approach by imposing differen-
tial rate schedules on compensation income and busi-
ness/professional income, and increased the lowest
marginal tax rate applicable to business/professional
income from 0 percent to 3 percent while reducing the
highest marginal tax rate from 35 percent to 30 percent.
In that year, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) also
expanded the coverage of the withholding tax system.
Then, in 1998, the Comprehensive Tax Reform Pack-
age (CTRP) was passed into law. With its enactment, the
pendulum once again swung toward the global system of
income taxation. It imposed a unified rate schedule for
both compensation and business/professional income
of individuals. The rate schedule under CTRP has 7 brack-
ets in contrast to the old schedule which had 11 brack-
ets for compensation income and 5 brackets for busi-
ness/professional income. The 1998 individual income
tax legislation also increased personal and additional ex-
emptions even as it allowed the deduction of premium
payments for health and/or hospitalization insurance from
gross income.3
The flip-flopping character of tax legislation over the
years is also evident for indirect taxes. For instance, in
1996, the coverage of the VAT was broadened to include
services with the passage of the Expanded Value Added
Tax (EVAT) but Republic Act 8241 (which took effect in
January 1997) expanded the list of items that are ex-
empted under the EVAT. Similarly, Republic Act 8240
(which became effective January 1997) reverted the ad
valorem excise tax on fermented liquor, distilled spirits
and cigarettes to the specific scheme.4
Tax effort
Concomitant with these developments, significant
gains in tax effort have been achieved with the ratio of
the total tax revenue to GNP climbing from an average of
11.3 percent of GNP in 1975-1985 to a peak of 16.3
percent in 1997 (Figure 1). Said improvement, however,
appears to have tapered off between 1992 and 1997.
While tax effort increased by a hefty 3 percentage points
in the 4-year period between 1986 and 1990, it rose by
a mere 1 percentage point in the 4-year period between
1992 and 1997. Moreover, tax effort started to tumble
with the onset of the Asian financial crisis as the tax-to-
GNP ratio dropped to 14.8 percent in 1998. It is alarm-
ing that this deterioration remains unabated as the tax
————————
2The last item is not usually viewed as part of the TxRP but as the
main element of the Tariff Reform Program (TfRP).
3The deduction of premium payments for health/hospitalization in-
surance from gross income may not exceed P2,400 per year per family.
Moreover, such deduction is applicable only if the total gross income of
the taxpayer is P250,000 or less.
4Prior to this, cigarettes were taxed on an ad valorem basis. This
change was made in response to tax avoidance/evasion practices of manu-




effort slipped further to 13.7 percent in 1999 even as
the economy posted some recovery.
Tax evasion
Collectively, the various tax measures installed since
1986 have served to simplify the tax structure and to
broaden the tax base (by limiting deductions and exemp-
tions). As such, together with the expanded coverage and
stricter implementation of tax with-
holding schemes, they are expected
to promote tax compliance.
Updated estimates of tax eva-
sion confirm improved tax compliance
between 1985 and 1995. Thus, the
evasion rate for the individual income
tax declined from 73.1 percent in
1985 to 60.0 percent in 1991 and
51.7 percent in 1995 (Table 1) while
that for the VAT on domestic sales
decreased from 68.2 percent in 1985
to 66.8 percent in 1991 and 60.0
percent in 1995 (Table 2).
However, tax evasion remains
prevalent and has worsened in more recent years. To wit,
the evasion rate for the individual income tax shot up to
60.8 percent in 1999 while that for the VAT on domestic






















































sales inched up to 62.6 percent. These developments
imply serious problems in tax administration. They also
suggest that one cannot rely on modifications in the tax
structure alone to correct shortcomings in tax adminis-
tration.
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A look at the new models of tax evasion
The theoretical literature on tax evasion (Allingham
and Sandmo 1972; Mookherjee 1998) demonstrates that
tax compliance is sensitive to economic incentives. The
basic models of tax evasion focus only on the taxpayer
and the factors that influence his behavior. In contrast,
the second-generation models bring in another player:
the tax collector. Furthermore, the tax collector himself
is viewed as being corruptible. The latter models then
analyze the joint behavior of the taxpayer and the tax
collector in response to changes in the tax rate, probabil-
ity of detection, penalty rate, and tax collector bonuses.
As such, these models suggest that a mechanical
approach to tax administration based entirely on its lo-
gistics and which excludes the taxpayer and tax collector
motivations may not be useful (Das Gupta and Mookherjee
1998). In this sense, these new models may provide some
practical guide to the reform of the tax administration
system.
Basic models of tax evasion
The basic models of tax evasion5 (Allingham and
Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974) start with an income-
maximizing taxpayer deciding how much of his income to
declare for tax purposes, given some constant probabil-
ity that evasion is detected and penalized with a fine.
The taxpayer chooses the level of income he will report
(or, alternatively, the amount of income he will hide from
the taxman) by taking into account in his own personal
calculus that if he successfully conceals some of his in-
come from the tax collector, he will increase the amount
of income he retains. On the other hand, if his action is
detected and he is punished, then his retained income
will be reduced by the amount of the fine. How the tax-
payer decides to act is, then, largely dependent on the
relative magnitude of the “temptation” and the “punish-
ment” attendant to tax evasion (Das Gupta and
Mookherjee 1998).
Penalty rate and probability of detection. In this
context, tax compliance clearly improves as the penalty
rate (or the size of the fine) and the probability of detec-
tion increases. On the one hand, the penalty rate is typi-
cally fixed and embodied in the tax laws. On the other
hand, the probability of detection is determined by the
ability of government to enforce the tax laws. Given this
perspective, the more vigorous efforts to successfully
prosecute tax offenders during the Aquino and Ramos
administrations together with the introduction of stiffer
penalties and creation of special tax courts in the early
1990s are steps in the right direction.6
Tax rate. At the same time, the impact of increas-
ing the tax rate on compliance is not as straightforward.
An increase in the tax rate will increase the temptation
to cheat but it will also increase the penalty for cheating
if the fines are imposed on an ad valorem basis. If the
taxpayer's qualms about being caught do not increase
with the amount of taxes being evaded, the punishment
effect is shown to dominate and an increase in the tax
rate leads to better compliance (Yitzhaki 1974). This find-
ing runs counter to the conventional wisdom that follows
from the so-called Laffer curve.7
Graduated penalties. These models also indicate
that maximal penalties for small amounts of evasion may
induce taxpayers to evade by large amounts. In turn, this
result suggests that penalties as well as the effort to
prosecute must be graduated with the scale of evasion
(Mookherjee and Png 1994).
Second-generation models
The basic models of tax evasion discussed above
essentially view the probability of detection and the pen-
alty rate as exogenous. By accounting for the presence
————————
5This model is also referred to as a model of voluntary tax compli-
ance.
6Das Gupta and Mookherjee (1998) noted that none of the cases
handled by the Prosecution Division of the BIR between 1980-1984 had
resulted in a conviction by 1986. In contrast, the number and effective-
ness of tax fraud investigations increased between 1986 and 1991, with
the prosecution of tax fraud cases resulting in the jailing of several promi-
nent individuals.
7The Laffer curve purports that raising tax rates beyond some level
leads to reductions in tax revenues (Stiglitz 1988).5
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of corruptible tax officials, the second-generation mod-
els make the probability of detection endogenous. In ef-
fect, tax evasion does not only depend on the incentives
to the taxpayer but also on the incentives to the tax col-
lector and the interaction between the two players (Das
Gupta and Mookherjee 1998).
In the second-generation models, the probability of
evasion being detected is viewed as a function of the
cost to the taxpayer of underreporting income. This cost,
in turn, depends on the penalty rate and the amount of
effort put in tax enforcement. When evasion is discov-
ered, the tax collector decides whether to report it and
impose a penalty. His decision depends on the incentive
structure that he faces. Thus, if the tax collector
underreports evasion successfully, he gets a bribe in
addition to his government salary. However, if he gets
caught, he is punished in the form of a fine, transfer to
another assignment or, at worst, dismissal from office
(all of which translates to a loss in income). The probabil-
ity that the errant tax collector gets caught is dependent
on the quality of supervision over tax examiners and third-
party audit. On the other hand, if the tax collector de-
cides to report the delinquent taxpayer, he may be al-
tive benefit of the taxpayer and the tax collector (i.e., the
expected benefit to the taxpayer in terms of additional
retained income less the bribe he has to pay minus the
expected cost to the taxman in terms of the penalties for
bribery and foregone bonus pay) is positive. Moreover, in
a corrupt regime, the taxpayer will select the amount of
tax to evade while the tax collector will select the effort
devoted to monitoring and, thus, the probability of de-
tecting evasion (Mookherjee 1998).
Tax audit and declared income. These newer mod-
els have then been used to evaluate alternative practical
measures in improving tax enforcement and the prob-
ability of detection. In particular, the original Allingham-
Sandmo model has been extended to evaluate how audit
frequency should vary with declared income (Das Gupta
and Mookherjee 1998). The results of this work show
that for a given class of taxpayers, audit frequency and
declared income ought to be negatively related. Intuitively,
this implies that a tax administration system that unduly
focuses on high income tax returns may be encouraging
taxpayers to evade by large amounts precisely because
doing so reduces the probability that they will be sub-
jected to the scrutiny of tax examiners. Conversely, the
tax administration system may deter taxpayers from evad-
ing “too much” by threatening to audit low-income tax
returns just as intensively as high-income tax returns.
The productivity of each audited case may indeed
be greater for large taxpayers. However, owing to the
pervasive effect of this policy on overall tax compliance,
the growth in total tax receipts may be higher if small/
medium taxpayers are likewise not neglected (Silvani
1992). This result is not entirely consistent with the em-
phasis currently being given to large taxpayers per se
without any clear audit selection strategy being defined.
The prevailing audit rate of less than 1.5 percent per
year is also low when compared with other developing
countries (Das Gupta and Mookherjee 1998).
Tax amnesties. In like manner, the basic model of
tax evasion has also been modified to assess the impact
of tax amnesties on tax revenues and tax compliance.
lowed to retain, as a reward or bonus, some portion of
the additional revenue that is generated because of his
vigilance. In the final analysis, the tax collector’s deci-
sion is then dependent on the relative strength of the
carrot and the stick: the amount of the bribe, the amount
of the reward/bonus, the amount of the fine/penalty and
the probability of being caught.
In the situation where a taxpayer decides to evade
taxes by some amount, corruption will occur if the collec-
"In the situation where a taxpayer decides
to evade taxes by some amount, corruption
will occur if the collective benefit of the
taxpayer and the tax collector...is positive."6
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The avowed objective of most tax amnesty programs is
to induce taxpayers to report previously hidden income
and assets. Consequently, tax amnesty is aimed at curb-
ing evasion by expanding the tax net to cover hitherto
unreported income and assets. Essentially, though, tax
amnesties are meant to allow the government to short-
circuit the tax enforcement process by allowing taxpay-
ers who are currently under investigation or prosecution
to “settle” their dues voluntarily, usually by applying a
more lenient tax rate. In this sense, the tax amnesty per-
mits the government to save on costs of monitoring and
prosecution, funding of which is oftentimes not forthcom-
ing.
Although most tax amnesty programs are designed
to be one-shot affairs, they have, in fact, been offered
repeatedly in many countries.8 Amnesties may differ as
to whether they are revision amnesties (i.e., an opportu-
nity for taxpayers to revise past returns), investigation
amnesties (i.e., a promise not to investigate the source
of income disclosed), or prosecution amnesties (i.e., an
immunity from prosecution for detected offenders).9
Oftentimes, but not always, the amnesty rate is dis-
counted. That is, the tax rate applicable to income dis-
closures during the amnesty period is below the tax rate
applicable to ordinary in-
come disclosures.
The model of tax am-
nesties yields a number of
interesting results (Das
Gupta and Mookherjee
1998). One, it suggests that
if tax enforcement is weak,
the amnesty rate may have to be set at a very low rate in
order to induce a significant response from delinquent
taxpayers. In deciding whether or not to declare addi-
tional income/assets during an amnesty, a taxpayer com-
pares the liability arising from the disclosure with the
expected costs of not declaring said income (i.e., the
sum of the expected penalties in the event that the un-
disclosed income is discovered during the amnesty pe-
riod and the expected future stream of additional after-
tax income arising from undeclared income if the erring
taxpayer is not caught). If the former is smaller than the
latter, the taxpayer will decide to declare hidden income.
However, if the tax administration system is ineffective,
the expected cost of not disclosing hidden income is small
because the probability of said evasion being detected is
also small. In such a situation, expected compliance gain
from the amnesty is minimal.
Two, if the tax amnesty is anticipated (because the
government repeatedly offers tax amnesties), there will
be an increase in tax evasion prior to the amnesty. More-
over, if tax enforcement is poor, anticipated tax amnes-
ties cause aggregate revenues to fall. The drop in rev-
enues results from the higher incidence of evasion in the
years prior to the amnesty and the discounted amnesty
rates that delinquent taxpayers pay during the amnesty
year. This explains why the tax take from the numerous
tax amnesties offered by the government (10 full between
1972 and 1981 and many partial amnesties since 1986)
has progressively gotten smaller (Das Gupta and
Mookherjee 1998).
Incentive bonuses for tax collectors. Other exten-
sions of the basic model focused on the alternative com-
————————
8This holds true for the Philippines which offered 10 tax amnesties
between 1972 and 1981 and still another one in 1986. In addition, a
scheme offering “last priority” audit was given in 1982, 1987, 1993
and 1999. Such schemes guarantee that taxpayers who declare income
that is higher than the previous year by a specified amount are given low
priority in the selection of audit. These then represent partial audit am-
nesties from investigation (Das Gupta and Mookherjee 1998).
9In the Philippines, most of the tax amnesties offered to date provide
immunity from investigation.
"...If tax enforcement is weak, the amnesty rate may have to be set at
a very low rate in order to induce a significant response from delinquent
taxpayers. In deciding whether or not to declare additional income/
assets during an amnesty, a taxpayer compares the liability arising




pensation provisions for tax collectors. One option is the
payment of salaries that are higher than the market rate.
Another option is the institution of a pay-for-performance
scheme whereby the tax collector is allowed to retain
part of the additional revenues generated from the re-
ported evasion. In either case, it is found that where the
government’s ability to punish corruption is weak, it may
be better not to pay tax collectors higher than market
salaries since higher compensation may simply increase
the bribe level. At the same time, higher-than-market
wages may increase the tax collectors' desire to stay in
their jobs, thereby reducing their interest in reporting
evaders with strong political connections. Another draw-
back of performance-based incentives is the possibility
that they may induce the harassment of taxpayers.
Mookherjee (1998) noted that the higher the bonus rate
and the cost of taxpayer appeal are and the lower the
rate of success of taxpayer appeal is, the greater the
likelihood of taxpayer harassment would be.
Implications on tax administration
Mookherjee (1998) thus argues that piecemeal in-
centive reform may increase corruption. “Because re-
forms in incentive systems
and organizational proce-
dures are complementary,
reforms are more likely to
succeed if they are compre-
hensive rather than incre-
mental.” In this regard, the
list of organizational re-
forms includes: (1) improv-
ing personnel quality; (2) in-
stitutionalizing independent
third-party audits; (3) limiting discretionary authority of
tax examiners; (4) introducing functional specialization
in tax administration; (5) increasing computerization; (6)
improving the appeal mechanism; and (7) reducing high-
level political interference.
] Increasing the compensation of tax collectors
and examiners will be useless if it is not accompanied by
the greater flexibility on the part of the tax administra-
tion agency to hire and fire personnel. More stringent
criteria for screening new recruits and for promoting ex-
isting personnel will greatly enhance the quality of tax
administration. Moreover, clear procedures for dealing
with reports of corrupt behavior and even-handed appli-
cation of sanctions for the same should be strictly ob-
served at all times.
] Independent third-party audits are necessary in
evaluating the audits undertaken by tax examiners. This
system will tend to increase the probability of detecting
corruption. Mexico’s experience in this area has been
positive and should be considered. For instance, if an
audit yields no additional assessment, the case cannot
be closed by the original tax examiner but must be re-
ferred to an officer in a different department. If x days
pass without any result, the original audit team is re-
placed by a new one. Audit results are reported to a rep-
resentative of the industry to which the taxpayer belongs.
If the industry group disagrees with the assessment, the
case is referred to the vigilance department. Any auditor
guilty of harassment is subject to prosecution.
] A centralized
audit selection system
could reduce the scope for
the discretionary authority
of tax examiners. Such a
scheme requires a central-
ized information base and
a strict procedure for audit
selection.
] Organizing the
tax administration agency along functional lines will tend
to reduce collusion of taxpayers and tax collectors. It will
minimize the possibility of the taxpayer having to deal
with the same tax officer for diverse tax functions as fil-
ing of returns, obtaining refunds, responding to audits,
and lodging appeals.
] The benefits from increased tax computeriza-
tion cannot be overemphasized as greater computeriza-
"Increasing the compensation of tax collec-
tors and examiners will be useless if it is not
accompanied by the greater flexibility on the




tion improves the tax collection agencies’ access to in-
ternal as well as external sources of information. This
makes possible the matching of tax returns with third-
party information. It also enhances the ability of the tax
collection agency to automate the generation of overdue
notices which enhances voluntary compliance. Moreover,
it makes it more difficult to tamper with records. Further-
more, it facilitates automated audit selection, thus re-
ducing the discretion of tax examiners.
] The appeals process can be enhanced by im-
proving the procedures for the filing of complaints, set-
ting of time limits for judgments, and establishment of
appropriate burden of proof.
] Efforts to eliminate bureaucratic corruption are
quixotic at best in systems with strongly entrenched po-
litical corruption (Mookherjee 1998). Thus, if tax evad-
ers have recourse to political influence such that tax au-
dit exposes the tax examiner to disciplinary action from
higher-ups, then no reform of the incentive structure will
work.
Given all these, there is therefore a need to re-
assess existing tax administration practices within the
context of how the prevailing institutional arrangements
create economic incentives that affect the behavior of
both taxpayers and tax collectors.
Epilogue: There is a widespread consensus that
the simplification of the tax structure (in the direction of
fewer exemptions, and less differentiation of tax rates
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across sectors and activities) will ease tax administra-
tion (Gillis 1989). Many of the tax laws enacted in the
Philippines in the last 15 years were justified on this
ground. However, a review of the experience gives one a
sense that the tax structure has been the subject of un-
necessary finetuning, at best, and excessive flip-flopping,
at worst. These frequent changes in the tax code simply
and necessarily impose an additional burden on tax ad-
ministration without addressing the complexities that natu-
rally accompany economic development.  4 4
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